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RESUMEN
The solution for the Contested Garment Problemproposed in the Babylonic Talmud,
one of the most important sources of inspiration for solving situations where demand
overcomes supply of some resources, suggests that each agent should receive at least some
part of the available amount when facing these situations. This idea has underlied the
theoretical analysis of bankruptcy problems from its beginning (ONeill, 1982) to present
day (Dominguez and Thomson, 2006). In this context, starting from the fact that a society
establishes its own set of Commonly Accepted Equity Principles, we propose a new lower
bound on awards dened, for each agent, as the minimum amount she gets according to
all the admissible rules for such a society. Moreover, we analyze the recursive application
of this new bound, since it will not exhaust the resources, in general.
Palabras clave: [Bankruptcy problems, bankruptcy rules, lower bound, recursive process.]
Clasicación JEL (Journal Economic Literature): [C71, D63, D71.]
Área temática: [Aspectos cuantitativos del fenómeno económico ]
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1 Introduction
A bankruptcy problem reects a situation where a group of agents claim more
quantity of a good than available. According to that, a bankruptcy rule prescribes
how to share out an amount of a perfectly divisible resource, called estate, among
a group of agents, depending on a prole of demands whose aggregate overcomes
its supply. In this context two natural questions arise: How should the available
resources be rationed among claimants? Should each agent have guaranteed a level
of awards?
The main goal of the two approaches to the study of bankruptcy problems: the
axiomatic and the game theoretical methods, has been identifying bankruptcy rules
by means of appealing properties. Following this line, many authors have found
reasonable establishing some bound on awards. In fact, the formal denition of a
solution for bankruptcy problems includes, by demanding that no agent gets more
than her claim and less than zero, both an upper and a lower bounds on awards. In
1982, ONeill [15] provides a new lower bound on awards called Respect of Minimal
Right, which requires that each claimant receives at least the available amount of
the estate after the other claimants have been fully compensated, or 0 if this amount
is negative. Later, Herrero and Villar [9, 10] introduce two properties that bound
awards, called Sustainability and Exemption. Sustainability says that, if we truncate
all claims by an agent is claim and the bankruptcy problem becomes feasible, then
agent i will get all her claim. Exemption demands that agent i does not be rationed
when equal division provides her more than she claims. After that, Moulin [14]
denes a new restriction on awards, called Lower Bound, which imposes that each
agent has the amount corresponding to the egalitarian division guaranteed except
those who demand less, in which case their demand is met in full. Afterwards,
Moreno-Ternero and Villar [12] present a weaker notion of Moulins Lower Bound,
named Securement, which says that each agent should obtain at least the nth part
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of her claim truncated at the amount to divide. Finally, Dominguez [7] proposes the
Min Lower Bound, which modies Securement by substituting each agents claim
by the lowest one.
Apart from Respect of Minimal Right, property which is implied by the formal
denition of a bankruptcy rule, the rest of the proposed limits on awards have been
justied by their own reasonability or appeal. Our goal is to establish restrictions
on awards taking as starting point a set, P, of basicrequirements, called Com-
monly Accepted Equity Principles, on which a society could willingly agree. Then
we consider the ordinary meaning of guarantee over all the bankruptcy rules satis-
fying properties in P as follows. By applying to a bankruptcy problem all Socially
Admissible Bankruptcy rules we determine the agents P-Safety as the lower amount
she gets among those ones provided by such rules. Finally, we dene the associated
bound on awards, Respect of P-Safety, by demanding that each agent receives, at
least, her P-Safety.
Since, in general, the aggregate guaranteed amount by means of our P-Safety
will not exhaust the available resources, we propose and analyze its recursive ap-
plication, called the Recursive P-Safety rule. The idea of recursivity is not new,
in fact it has already been used for introducing bankruptcy rules by Alcalde et al.
[2], who generalize the Ibn Ezras proposal, and by Dominguez and Thomson [8],
who propose the Recursive rule by using the Moreno-Ternero and Villars concept
of boundedness, among other authors. Dominguez [7] also studies the behavior of
the recursive application of a generic bound.
In this paper we apply the previous methodology to di¤erent sets of Commonly
Accepted Equity Principles. First of all, we propose as basic properties the set P1,
composed by Resource Monotonicity, Super-Modularity and Midpoint Property. In
this case we nd out that the P-Safety is the minimum of Piniles rule (Piniles
[17]) and its dual. Moreover, we prove that the Recursive P-Safety rule retrieves
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the Dual of Piniles rule. Secondly, we only consider, as equity principles, Resource
Monotonicity and Order Preservation, that is P2. Then, we show that the associ-
ated P-Safety is the minimum of two di¤erent extreme bankruptcy solutions, the
Constrained Equal Awards rule (many authors, see Thomson [20]) and its dual, the
Constrained Equal Losses rule (Maimonides 12th Century, among others). Besides
this, we demonstrate that the Recursive P-Safety rule retrieves the Constrained
Equal Losses rule.
Our previous results could be written as follows: The recursive application of
the P-Safety recovers, in the set of all admissible bankruptcy rules according to
both P1 and P2, one of its extremes, that one providing more awards to the higher
claimants. Then, the analysis of the generalization of this statement arises as a nat-
ural question. With this aim, we dene a new set of socially accepted requirements,
P3; consisting of Resource Monotonicity, Order Preservation andMidpoint Property.
Surprisingly enough, since P2  P3  P1, we show both that this generalization is
not possible and that the rule obtained by the recursive application of the P-Safety
does not satisfy the equity principles which this process is based on.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 pro-
poses our new approach for bounding awards and its recursive application. Section
4 provides new basis to classical bankruptcy rules using the previous ideas, and the
incompatibility of the proposed process with some appealingset of equity princi-
ples. Section 5 summarizes our conclusions. Finally, all the resutls are proved in
Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil [11].
2 Preliminaries
A bankruptcy problem is a situation where the agentsdemand of a good exceeds
its supply. Formally,
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E is known as the estate, and represents the perfectly divisible good quantity
that should be distributed among the agents in N = f1; :::; i; :::; ng. Each agent
i 2 N has a claim ci on the estate. Claims add up to more than the available
amount. Therefore, the resource should be rationed.
For notational convenience, B will denote the set of all bankruptcy problems,
problems from now on; C the sum of the agents claims, C =
P
i2N
ci; L the total
amount of losses to distribute among the agents, L = C   E; and B0 the set of
problems in which claims are increasingly ordered, that is problems with ci  cj for
i < j.
A bankruptcy rule associates for each problem a distribution of the available
amount among the group of claimants. Next, we present this concept formally and
dene the rules that will be used in the following sections, emphasizing their dual
relations.
Denition 2 A bankruptcy rule, or simply a rule, is a function, ' : B ! Rn+;




'i(E; c) = E (e¢ ciency) and
(b) 0  'i(E; c)  ci for each i 2 N (non-negativity and claim-boundedness).
Constrained Equal Awards rule (Maimonides 12th Century, among others) rec-
ommends equal gains to all claimants subject to no-one receiving more than her
claim.
Constrained Equal Awards rule, CEA: for each (E; c) 2 B and each i 2 N;
CEAi(E; c)  min fci; g ; where  is chosen so that
P
i2N
min fci; g = E:
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Piniles rule (Piniles [17]) assigns the Constrained Equal Awards rule when the
available amount is less than the half-sum of the claims. Otherwise, rst each agent
receives her half-claim, then the Constrained Equal Award rule is re-applied to divide
the remainder but using the agentshalf-claims in the formula.
Pinilesrule, Pin: for each (E; c) 2 B and each i 2 N;
Pini(E; c) 
8><>:
CEAi(E; c=2) if E  C=2
ci=2 + CEAi(E   C=2; c=2) if E  C=2
:
Constrained Egalitarian rule (Chun et al. [?]) is inspired by the Uniform rule
(Sprumont [19]), a solution to the problem of fair division when the preferences
are single-peaked. It makes the minimal adjustment in the formula of the Uniform
rule taking the half-claims as the peak and guaranteeing that awards are ordered as
claims are.
Constrained Egalitarian rule, CE : for each (E; c) 2 B and each i 2 N;
CE i(E; c) 
8><>:
CEAi(E; c=2) if E  C=2
maxfci=2;minfci; gg if E  C=2
;
where  is chosen so that
P
i2N
CE i(E; c) = E:
Given a rule '; its dual shares losses in the same way as ' divides the available
amount (Aumann and Maschler [1]).
The dual rule of ', denoted by 'd; assigns for each (E; c) 2 B and each
i 2 N; 'di (E; c) = ci   'i(L; c):
It is straightforward to check that for each rule, ', its dual is well dened since
given (E; c) 2 B, (L; c) 2 B and given that ' satises e¢ ciency, non-negativity and
claim-boundedness, 'd will as well.
Constrained Equal Losses rule, discussed byMaimonides (Aumann andMaschler
[1]), is the dual of the Constrained Equal Awards rule (Herrero [9]). Specically, it
chooses the awards vector at which losses from the claims vector are the same for
all agents subject to no-one receiving a negative amount.
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Constrained Equal Losses rule, CEL: for each (E; c) 2 B and each i 2 N;
CELi(E; c)  max f0; ci   g ; where  is chosen so that
P
i2N
max f0; ci   g = E.
Dual of Piniles rule assigns the Constrained Equal Losses rule when the avail-
able amount is less than the half-sum of the claims. Otherwise, rst each agent
receives her half-claim, then the Constrained Equal Losses rule is re-applied to di-
vide the remainder but only taking into account the agentshalf-claims.
Dual of Pinilesrule, DPin: for each (E; c) 2 B and each i 2 N;
DPini(E; c) =
8><>:
ci=2 min fci=2; g if E  C=2
ci=2 + (ci=2 min fci=2; g) if E  C=2
;
where  is such that
P
i2N
DPini(E; c) = E.
Dual Constrained Egalitarian rule gives the half-claims a central role and makes
the minimal adjustment in the formula of the Dual Uniform rule to guarantee that
losses are ordered as claims are.
Dual Constrained Egalitarian rule, DCE : for each (E; c) 2 B and each
i 2 N;
DCE i(E; c) 
8><>:
ci  max fci=2;min fci; gg if E  C=2
ci  min fci=2; g if E  C=2
;
where  is chosen such that
P
i2N
DCE i(E; c) = E:
Next, we introduce some properties of rules which, subsequently, will be in-
terpreted as Commonly Accepted Equity Principles, and we present the notion of
Self-Duality between rules. Let ' be a generic rule.
Resource Monotonicity (Curiel et al. [5], Young [?] and others) demands that
if the estate increases, then all individuals should receive at least as much as they
did initially.
Resource Monotonicity: for each (E; c) 2 B and for each E 0 2 R+ such that
C  E 0 > E; then 'i(E 0; c)  'i(E; c); for each i 2 N:
XVI Jornadas de ASEPUMA y IV Encuentro Internacional
Rect@ Vol Actas_16 Issue 1:104
7
Jiménez-Gómez, José M.; Marco-Gil, M.Carmen
Order Preservation (Aumann and Maschler [1]) requires respecting the claims
order, i.e., if agent is claim is at least as large as agent js claim, she should receive
and she should loss at least as such agent j does respectively.
Order Preservation: for each (E; c) 2 B and each i; j 2 N such that ci  cj;
then 'i(E; c)  'j(E; c) and ci   'i(E; c)  cj   'j(E; c):
Super-Modularity (Dagan et al. [6]) demands, when the estate increases, that
agents with larger claims receive a greater part of the increment than those with
lower claims.
Super-Modularity: for each (E; c) 2 B; all E 0 2 R+ and each i; j 2 N such
that C  E 0 > E and ci  cj; then 'i(E 0; c)  'i(E; c)  'j(E 0; c)  'j(E; c):
Midpoint Property (Chun, Schummer and Thomson [?]) says that if the estate is
equal to the sum of the half-claims, then every individual should get her half-claim.
Midpoint Property: for each (E; c) 2 B such that E = C=2; 'i(E; c) = ci=2;
for each i 2 N .
Self-Duality implies that a rule treats symmetrically the problem of dividing
what is availableand the problem of dividing what is missing.
Self-Duality: for each (E; c) 2 B and each i 2 N; 'i(E; c) = ci   'i(L; c):
Finally, we present the idea of duality between properties, which has been an-
alyzed by many authors (see, for instance, Herrero and Villar [?] and Moulin [13]).
Two properties, P and P 0; are dual if whenever a rule, '; satises P, its dual,
'd; satises P 0. A property, P, is Self-Dual when it coincides with its dual.
It is straightforward to check that all the properties previously introduced, Re-
source Monotonicity, Order Preservation, Super-Modularity, andMidpoint Property,
are Self-Dual, a fact that will be used later on.
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3 A new approach: Bounding awards from equity
principles.
As we have noted, most of the lower bounds on awards that have been proposed
in the literature have been justied by their own reasonability. A clear exception
is Respect of Minimal Right, which requires that each claimant receives at least the
available amount of the estate after the other claimants have been fully compensated,
or 0 if this amount is negative. This property, as Thomson [20] pointed out, is
a consequence of e¢ ciency, non-negativity and claim boundedness together (See
Denition 2).
In this section we introduce a new method for bounding awards based on a set of
Commonly Accepted Equity Principlesby a society. With this aim and considering
such a set of basic properties, next we propose the following extension of a problem.
Denition 3 A Bankruptcy Problem with Legitimate Principles is a vector
(E; c; P ) where (E; c) 2 B and P is a set of principles on which a society has agreed.
From now on, let P be the set of all subsets of properties on bankruptcy rules,
and let BP be the set of all Problems with Legitimate Principles.
In this context, a Socially Admissible bankruptcy rule is a rule satisfying all
properties in P .
Denition 4 A Socially Admissible rule, or simply an Admissible rule, is a
function,
_





'i(E; c;P) = E,
(b) 0 
_
'i(E; c;P)  ci for each i 2 N , and
(c)
_
' satises all properties in P .
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Let  denote the set of all rules and let (P) be the subset of rules satisfying
P .
Taking extended problems as a starting point, we propose a new lower bound
on awards based on the application of the ordinary meaning of guarantee. That is,
each agent will receive at least her lower amount among those ones provided by all
the rules satisfying the selected properties. Formally,
Denition 5 Given (E; c;P) in BP ; the P-Safety, s, is for each i 2 N;
si(E; c;P) = min
'2(P)
f'i(E; c)g :
Now, using the previous idea of guarantee, our new lower bound on awards,
called Respect of P-Safety, demands that each claimant receives at least her P-
Safety.
Denition 6 Given P 2 P; a rule ' satises Respect of P-Safety if for each
(E; c) 2 B and each i 2 N; 'i(E; c)  si(E; c;P):
Since, in general, the sum of the P-Safeties of a problem (E; c;P) will not
exhaust the available quantity of resources, properties requiring composition from
such a lower bound arise in a natural way. These properties ask the awards vector
to be equivalently obtainable (i) directly, or (ii) by rst assigning to each agent
her lower bound on awards, adjusting claims down by these amounts, and nally,
applying the rule to divide the remainder. The following denition applies this idea
to our bound on awards.
Denition 7 Given P 2 P; a rule ' satises P-Safety First if for each (E; c) 2 B
and each i 2 N , 'i(E; c) = si(E; c; P ) + 'i(E  
P
i2N
si(E; c; P ); c  s(E; c; P )):
Although many of the proposed lower bound on awards are respected by most
of the rules, composition from such lower bounds is quite demanding. For instance,
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Respect of Minimal Right is satised by any rule, however none of the Proportional,
Constrained Equal Awards or Minimal Overlap rules satisfy Minimal Right First
(See Thomson [20]). In fact, imposing this kind of composition or equivalently
applying a recursive method from a lower bound on awards, has been used to propose
new rules. Next, following the previous ideas, we dene the recursive application of
our P-Safety, which will be called the Recursive P-Safety Process.
Denition 8 Given m 2 N, the Recursive P-Safety Process at the m-th step,
RSm, associates for each (E; c; P ) 2 BP and each i 2 N;
[RSm(E; c; P )]i = si(E
m; cm; P );
where (E1; c1)  (E; c) and for m  2;




m 1; cm 1; Pt); c
m 1   s(Em 1; cm 1; P )):
According to this process, an agent will get at the rst step her P-Safety of the
original problem. At the second step, we redene the residual problem, in which the
estate is the remaining resources and the claims are adjusted down by the amounts
just given. Then each agent receives her P-Safety of such a residual problem, and so
on. Let us note that, in general, it can not be ensured that the sum of the amounts
that agents get in each and everyone of the previous steps provides an Admissible
rule, but when that happens, we will call it the Recursive P-Safety rule1.
Denition 9 The Recursive P-Safety rule,
_
'
R, associates for each (E; c; P ) 2




i (E; c; P ) =
1P
m=1












R satises all properties in P .
1Let us note that non-negativity and claim boundedness are satised by construction. Moreover,
it can be checked (by adapting the proof of Remark 3 in Appendix 1) that whenever the P-Safety
provides, in each step, a positive amount to some agent, e¢ ciency is met.
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4 Main results
In this section we consider three possible choices of Commonly Accepted Equity
Principles by a society to apply the approach introduced previously for bounding
awards.
Specically,
P1 = fResource Monotonicity, Super-Modularity and Midpoint Property},
P2 = fResource Monotonicity and Order-Preservation} and
P3 ={Resource Monotonicity, Order Preservation and Midpoint Property}.
Starting from Bosmans and Lauwers [3] and Schummer and Thomson [18], and
using the concept of dual rule and the fact that all the properties considered are
Self-Dual, we obtain our next two results which dene the opposite extreme rules
marking out the region of admissible path of awards for P1 and P2, respectively.
Theorem 1 For each (E; c) 2 B, the Dual of Pinilesrule is the only one in (P1)
such that: (i) the gap between the smallest and the largest loss any claimant incurs
is the smallest, and (ii) the variance of the losses incurred by all claimants is the
smallest.
Proof. See Section 4 in Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil [11].
Theorem 2 For each (E; c) 2 B, the Constrained Equal Losses rule is the only one
in  such that: (i) the gap between the smallest and the largest loss any claimant
incurs is the smallest, and (ii) the variance of the losses incurred by all claimants
is the smallest.
Proof. See Section 4 in Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil [11].
The following lemmas determine the P-Safety for both P1 and P2.
Lemma 3 Given (E; c; P1) in BP ; the P-Safety, s;is for each i 2 N;
si(E; c; P1) = min fPin i(E; c);DPin i(E; c)g :
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Proof. See Section 4 in Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil [11].
Lemma 4 Given (E; c; P2) in BP ; the P-Safety, s;is for each i 2 N;
si(E; c; P2) = min fCEAi(E; c);CELi(E; c)g :
Proof. See Section 4 in Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil [11].
Next theorems prove that the recursive application of the P-Safety retrieves the
Dual of Piniles rule for P1 and the Constrained Equal Losses rule for P2.





(E; c; P1) =DPin(E; c):
Proof. See Appendices 1 and 2 in Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil [11].
Theorem 6 For each (E; c; P2) 2 BP ; the Recursive P-Safety rule is the Con-




(E; c; P2) =CEL(E; c):
Proof. See Appendices 1 and 3 in Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil [11].
These rules represent the extreme and opposite ways of sharing awards among
conicting claims in the set of Admissible rules according to the imposed require-
ments. Moreover we have proved, contrary to the rst intuition which would be
to get something in the middle of these extreme rules when applying the recursive
procedure, that the corresponding Recursive P-Safety rule retrieves one of these
extremes; the extreme favoring the largest claims when focusing on awards or the
opposite one when sharing what is missing. In this sense, our results can be inter-
preted as new basis for old rules. So that, a natural question comes up:
For any appealing equity principles set, Would its P-Safety recursive application
recover one of the extremes which dene the area of all the Admissible rules?
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To answer this question let us consider the set of equity principles P3 which is
an intermediatesituation more permissive than P1, since we require Order Preser-
vation instead of Super-Modularity, but more restrictive than P2, since we add the
Midpoint Property.
Starting from Chun, Schummer and Thomson [4], and using the concept of dual
rule and the fact that all the properties considered are Self-Dual, we obtain our next
result which dene the opposite extreme rules marking out the region of admissible
path of awards for P3.
Theorem 7 For P ={Resource Monotonicity and Midpoint Property} and for each
(E; c) 2 B, the Dual Constrained Egalitarian rule is the only one in (P ) such
that: (i) the gap between the smallest and the largest loss any claimant incurs is the
smallest, and (ii) the variance of the losses incurred by all claimants is the smallest
Proof. See Section 5 in Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil [11].
The following lemma determine the P-Safety for both P3.
Lemma 8 Given (E; c; P3) in Bp; the P-Safety, s, is for each i 2 N;
si(E; c; P3) = min fCE i(E; c);DCE i(E; c)g :
Proof. See Section 5 in Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil [11].
In this context, we show that, although for the two-person problems the recur-
sive application of the P-Safety for P3 retrieves the Dual Constrained Egalitarian
rule, this fact can not be generalized.
Theorem 9 For each two-person Problem with Legitimate Principles in BP with





i (E; c; P3) =DCEi(E; c):
Proof. See Appendices 1 and 4 in Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil [11].
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Proposition 10 There is a problem, (E; c) 2 B; for which the sum of all the
amounts that agents get by the recursive application of her P-Safety for P3 does
not coincide with the Dual Constrained Egalitarian rule,
1P
m=1
[RSm(E; c; P3)] 6=DCE(E; c):
Proof. See Appendices 1 and 5 in Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil [11].
Our next proposition points out that the composition of appealing equity
principles and naturalprocesses for nding solutions does not always guarantee
desirable results. Particularly, it emphasizes both the need of being very careful
when establishing the equity principles of the society if the procedure seems appro-
priated, and the need of searching processes which respect these principles, if they
are considered irremovable.
Proposition 11 For P3, the rule obtained by adding up all the amounts provided
by the Recursive P-Safety Process does not satisfy Resource Monotonicity.
Proof. See Appendices 1 and 5 in Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil [11].
Finally, let us note that the previous analysis can be applied on losses by using
the idea of duality. When focusing on losses, the starting point will be the same sets
of Commonly Accepted Equity Principles, P1 and P2, since all the considered prop-
erties are Self-Dual. Moreover, dening for each (E; c) 2 B, the P-Safety for the
associated problem (L; c) and applying it recursively, it can be shown that Piniles,
the Constrained Equal Awards rules are retrieved for P1 and P2; respectively, and,
for P3; the Constrained Egalitarian rule for two-person problems but without guar-
anteing an Admissible rule for the n-person case.
Let us conclude this section noting that, probably, it would not be di¢ cult nd-
ing a society which accepts Resource Monotonicity, Order Preservation and Mid-
point Property, willingly, and which considers fairly naturalour Recursive P-Safety
Process. However, we are sure that the result of this puzzle would not be accepted
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by any member of such a society, since it provides a rule which does not satisfy one
of the equity principles upon which the society initially agreed to found its decisions;
that is, Resource Monotonicity, one of the properties considered unquestionable in
the literature.
5 Conclusions
We have taken up again a research line which has underlied the theoretical
analysis of bankruptcy problems from its beginning: the search of a fairminimum
amount that each agent should receive when facing these situations. In this context,
our main contribution is a new method for bounding awards based on a set of
Commonly Accepted Equity Principles by a society. Starting from this set, our
proposal, called P-Safety, is obtained by assigning each agent the lower amount she
gets according to all admissible rules for such a society. The fact that some part of
the resources will be still available once we allocate each agent this amount has led
us to introduce the Recursive P-Safety rule, which lies in the recursive application
of our new bound.
Our main results are obtained by particularizing the previous methodology to
di¤erent equity principle sets which can be interpreted, from our point of view,
as basicrequirement. We have retrieved, respectively, for two possible societies,
restrictive and permissive, the Dual of Piniles and the Constrained Equal Losses
rules when focussing on awards; and Piniles and the Constrained Equal Awards
rules when sharing losses. Next, we have ascertained that the composition of both
reasonableprinciples and recursivity, a standardway of exhausting the resources,
does not always provide desirable distributions. To show this fact we have not
dened an articial set of legitimate properties. Rather the contrary, by considering
a society in the middle, we have shown that the Recursive P-Safety rule does not
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satisfy one of the equity principles upon which such a society initially agreed to
found its decisions. So that, the necessity of studying in depth the consequences of
the social agreements on both principles and procedure has been emphasized, since
when putting them together could become meaningless.
Summarizing, this paper: (i) o¤ers the understanding of old bankruptcy rules
from a new angle, (ii) warns of the dangers that may involve the composition of
a prioriappropriate pieces of a puzzle, and (iii) strengthens and complements the
noncooperative support of the Constrained Equal Losses rule provided by Herrero
[9], since from totally di¤erent starting points, although under somehow similar
mathematical modelization, retrieve the same bankruptcy rule, that is, axiomatic
and strategic methods converge.
Therefore, the following questions remain open: the study of theDual of Piniles
and the Dual Constrained Egalitarian rules from the strategic point of view; the
search of new procedures which ensure the compatibility with socially accepted
equity principles; and the analysis of conditions on the legitimate principle sets for
guaranteeing their fulllment when applying our recursive process.
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